

CASES OF MAPPING OUTCOMES

Leadership for Results: Developing Capacity and Delivering Results Toward Public Sector Reform in Burundi

Since 2006, government leaders and teams in Burundi have engaged in collaborative problem-solving using results-oriented management tools. They have been learning how to overcome the institutional constraints that block the improvement of their public services and reforms and to draw lessons to scale-up solutions across ministries and sectors. The World Bank Institute (WBI) Leadership for Results (L4R) program in Burundi supported the government to develop and adapt the results-oriented tools, strategy, coaching and training for this program specific to their own context to achieve their reform goals.

To capture the change process toward development impact upon the civil service from outcomes delivered throughout the duration of this project, WBI mapped more than 40 outcomes¹ from this program using a customized outcome mapping tool². The outcomes show examples of changes from the larger program that have impacted the entire civil service of

Development Objective

Improve delivery of central and decentralized public services for citizens at all levels in Burundi.

Problem

As a fragile post-conflict state, Burundi must unblock constraints to help its civil service rebuild leadership that will be held accountable for delivering effective services to citizens, especially in remote areas. Problems include corruption, weak collaboration across government ministries, inefficient rules, limited adaptability and legitimacy of processes.

Specific Objectives

Strengthen public sector leadership and participatory strategies to rebuild services in priority areas; improve effectiveness of public service delivery for citizens; combat corruption and policy inefficiencies that hinder development outcomes; strengthen the National School of Administration (Ecole Nationale d'Administration, or ENA) to support results-focused learning within the civil service for improved project implementation.

Burundi. Outcomes were mapped to illustrate changes in the leadership and authorizing environment for results in the public sector, adaptive learning around results to rebuild the civil service at all levels and institutionalization of results across the civil service.

These visual maps present the sequence of outcomes achieved by change agents—the leaders and teams, coaches at different levels and other actors involved in the process. The maps illustrate how the outcomes connected and built on each other over time to form multi-actor, institutional processes for change to address the program’s objectives and goal.

WBI team members identified and formulated the outcomes, presenting an explanation of their significance and how WBI had contributed—directly or indirectly, in a small or big way, intentionally or not—by empowering the change agents to take new actions. Then, roughly 20% of the outcomes were independently substantiated for credibility in the mapping exercise.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, Burundi was emerging from a 12-year civil war. It had recently established a constitution, elected a President and prepared a national Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). A key challenge was how to meet results for citizens given its limited human capacity, limited resources and institutional problems. Government at all levels and especially in remote areas faced high turnover and low levels of capacity in staff to perform their responsibilities. Many constraints blocked improvements for citizens and reforms to strengthen governance, economic growth and other priorities: the public sector faced policy inefficiencies, a lack of accountability to citizens, dysfunctional communication between ministries and outdated policies.

Given these challenges and the concern of stakeholders to rebuild Burundi’s public sector, the new government wanted to develop leadership and management of project and implementation capacities within the public sector and learn how to generate results to advance priorities set by stakeholders in the PRS. Delivering on the newly elected President’s pledges in his five-year plan—which included free primary education and child health care—was important to demonstrate success in delivering needed services and to gain political capital and trust.

Burundi’s political leaders embraced the new approaches of the L4R program, which included:

- High-level government retreats and oversight processes to prioritize results areas, provide an authorizing environment for change and encourage a culture of results and learning.
- The empowerment of leaders at different levels and their implementation teams to become results-focused and engage in efforts to iteratively identify solutions for increased effectiveness throughout the public sector.

Through the L4R program, leaders set specific goals for results improvements and engage with teams to pilot initiatives to experiment with solutions. The teams collaboratively track progress to adaptively learn from what works and does not work to address constraints and enable achievement of the desired results.

Through this program, the second Vice President requested WBI’s assistance to strengthen the capacities of the country’s leaders to drive change at the institutional level, accelerating the implementation of national programs aimed at delivering results for citizens. WBI offered advisory support to the L4R program’s steering committee, guidance and rapid results coaching to civil service leaders to adopt and integrate the results-focused management tools and support to ENA to train civil servants and develop a curriculum starting in 2010.

OUTCOME AREAS

The process of change from this program can be seen in three streams of outcomes that represent the major change paths, as seen in Figure 1:

- (1) Leadership and Authorizing Environment for Results
- (2) Results Toward Reforms Through Adaptive Learning-by-Doing
- (3) Embedded Results-oriented Problem-Solving in Public Sector.

All of the outcomes were analyzed and classified according to the types of change they achieved. They were then grouped based on how they connected to each other to form a story for change. The maps in Figures 2–5 summarize the outcomes and correspond to the numbers in brackets within the text.

Outcome Area 1: Leadership and authorizing environment for results

Enabling a public sector leadership supportive of results-oriented action has been important to the overall change strategy of the L4R program.

From the start, the second Vice President of Burundi (Burundi has two Vice Presidents) initiated the

Figure 1. Change strategy showing how change happened to advance progress toward goal





Figure 2. Map of outcomes showing overall changes linked and built over an eight-year timeframe



2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Institutional changes				Learning/capacity changes			
Outcomes related to societal, policy and organizational changes.				Other outcomes related to awareness, knowledge or skills, collaborative action, or the use of knowledge or innovative solutions.			
— Leadership and participatory priority setting to strengthen public sector reforms				* Outcomes selected for substantiation; see page 8 sidebar.			
~ Policy changes to combat inefficiencies and corruption							
- - - Effectiveness, adaptability and responsiveness of public service delivery							
Other outcomes							
◇◇◇ Outcomes that changed direction or thinking behind the initiative							

L4R program to develop capacity within the public sector staff to problem-solve to address constraints in public services and advance governance and other reforms. The second Vice President headed a Steering Committee to provide a coordination mechanism that would sustain focus and action for the program. This provided a strong authorizing environment for the program's implementation. [1]³

In late 2006, the Steering Committee agreed that the first pilot initiatives to advance results in the PRS would be in the health and education sectors. [2] This decision was based upon initial scoping and analysis work undertaken through background studies in these sectors and a collaborative prioritization process. During the first government retreat the Steering Committee also started to use South-South exchanges to enhance their opportunities for learning under the L4R program, drawing upon experiences from Rwanda and Madagascar of using the L4R program in reform processes and international experts applying results-oriented management tools and adaptive leadership techniques to implement their development strategies. [3]

In May 2007, Ministries of Health and Education officials publicized the successful results of their first pilot initiatives at a high-level government retreat within this program, with the President, cabinet members and representatives from civil society organizations (CSOs) participating. Some examples of the results are that the Ministry of Health increased the number of pregnant women being tested for HIV in the province from 71 to 482 within 30 days, and the Ministry of Education delivered 25,000 textbooks throughout the province within 60 days instead of the normal time of around one year. [4] (The Ministry of Education pilot is described in Outcome Area 2.)

The pilots demonstrated solutions to overcome long-standing constraints in two priority sectors, jumpstarting results beyond expectations. This "demonstration effect" allowed stakeholders to see the potential for a transversal government program that could support individual ministries as well as cross-sector teams to collaborate and find solutions to rebuild institutions and systems in Burundi. Based on this initial proof of results, the second Vice President committed to extend the L4R program. [5]

In June 2007, the second Vice President, as head of the Steering Committee, committed to build knowledge among public servants around the results-oriented management tools of the L4R program to tackle

constraints across the public sector. To support this effort, he initiated a process to train coaches across the government. Ministries could then use the methods to jumpstart new initiatives and unblock those that had become stuck. [6]

As the L4R program expanded to additional ministries throughout the duration of the program, government retreats were organized periodically as a tool for oversight and review of initiatives as well as planning. The retreats also provided a forum for South-South exchanges to learn from officials in other African countries, such as Kenya, which had developed a similar public sector results-focused program. Key outcomes linked to the government retreat process included:

- Initiatives were implemented by a growing number of ministries by March 2009. During the government retreat held at this time, the President reviewed the progress of the results and learning from the ongoing initiatives under the L4R program and he, along with his two Vice Presidents, expressed further commitment to broaden and institutionalize the program's culture of results within the government to advance PRS results. [11]
- Following the second government retreat in March 2009, the Vice Presidents of Burundi agreed to sign a public decree to mandate expansion of the program across government. [12]
- In March 2011, the President and Steering Committee of the L4R program held a government retreat to prioritize solutions and plans to confront three areas where stronger results were critical: economic growth, public finance and fiscal space and governance. [13]
- In December 2011, a retreat was held to prioritize the use of the L4R program to implement the National Strategy for Good Governance and Anti-Corruption as well as improve the Doing Business indicators for Burundi. [15]

Initiatives using rapid cycle learning were cyclically launched following these high-level events to translate into action the recommendations emerging from each high-level retreat. Each retreat reinforced the continuing commitment of the government to use the L4R program to deliver results for Burundians. The President's involvement in oversight throughout the process and participation during all of these events ensured continued commitment to the program from leaders in government ministries, and encouraged their experimentation and learning around results.

Contribution of WBI to Outcome Area 1: WBI had influenced the second Vice President's commitment to act on the need for capacity development of public sector leaders and teams during a scoping mission to Burundi in May 2006, which secured the agreement of the then Vice Presidents to support a L4R program. WBI supported the creation of a new Leadership Steering Committee to initiate and oversee the implementation of the program. Background studies were recommended to understand the priority areas and inform the design of pilot initiatives to demonstrate the use of rapid results for problem-solving. WBI facilitated the use of rapid results and South-South exchange in the first cabinet retreats.

WBI facilitated the process of periodic government retreats by engaging senior leaders and experts from other African countries to provide peer perspectives, providing space for collaboration to analyze and learn from the pilot initiatives, providing technical assistance on using results-focused initiatives to design plans that would translate recommendations from the retreats into initiatives and constructing teams for executing each part. WBI also supported aligning priorities from the retreat held in March 2011 to the World Bank Strategy for Africa, and to the Doing Business Indicators and good governance program during the retreat held in December 2011.

Overall, this first stream of outcomes demonstrated the creation of an authorizing environment at the highest level across government. Presidential and ministerial leadership developed a blend of results-oriented management tools for the L4R program from multi-agency setting of priority areas for pilot initiatives. Government retreats and review meetings to demonstrate and provide feedback on the value of results were instrumental in building a culture of results.

Outcome Area 2: Results toward reforms through learning

A key part of the change strategy of the L4R program also involved the use of pilot initiatives to adaptively learn. In each pilot, teams of Burundian civil servants and community members were empowered to identify solutions to address specific systemic constraints. The solutions could be scaled-up and shared with other agencies facing similar problems.

Three pilots selected from over 400 initiatives implemented to date provide examples of the problem-solving process for results; the visual maps in Figures 3–5 correspond to their outcomes.

Pilot 1: Delivering textbooks in Bubanza province (Figure 3)

Between November 2006 and January 2007, the Ministry of Education launched a successful pilot initiative for the L4R program in the province of Bubanza. It addressed the problem of textbooks reaching schools, since the system for distribution of textbooks had lapsed during the civil war. Through this pilot, provincial education officials, development partners and citizens collaborated to address constraints that blocked education service delivery and quality in the provinces, and they built a solution for efficient delivery of textbooks to schools. This outcome chain was one of the first demonstrations of results from the L4R program.


Attention to problem

The process began with the Director General of the Ministry of Education at the central government level meeting with the Provincial Director of Education in Bubanza province to discuss the problem of delivering textbooks to villages in the province. [a] This initiated a series of steps to address the problem. The Director General negotiated reduced transportation rates with transport companies and re-allocated funds to make it more financially manageable to transport books from the capital city to the provincial towns given the limited budget. [b] The Provincial Director of Education tried to mobilize volunteers in the province to assist in moving the textbooks to more remote areas. However, due to limited resources and authority the Provincial Director was unable to mobilize sufficient support. [c] Consequently, the Provincial Director met with the Governor of the province, who oversaw all sectors of service delivery in the province, to request assistance to draw attention to the problem among stakeholders. [d] One lesson learned here was that creating the authorizing environment to address the problem required cross-sector support - reaching outside the education sector alone.

Collaborative problem-solving

The Governor of the province took responsibility and mobilized development actors, local government staff and citizens within his province to assist in the chain of delivery from the provincial to the village level. [e] The Governor called a townhall meeting that mobilized key actors for delivering textbooks from the provincial capital city to the communes, including from provincial directors in other sectors (agriculture, public works, transport, education), and development partners

Figure 3. Pilot I: Delivering textbooks to villages in Bubanza Province, November–May 2006



Institutional changes

Outcomes related to societal, policy and organizational changes.

- Leadership and participatory priority setting to strengthen public sector reforms
- ~ Policy changes to combat inefficiencies and corruption
- - - Effectiveness, adaptability and responsiveness of public service delivery

Learning/capacity changes

Other outcomes related to awareness, knowledge or skills, collaborative action, or the use of knowledge or innovative solutions.

Other outcomes

- ◇◇◇ Outcomes that changed direction or thinking behind the initiative

(development projects, NGOs, other) operating in the area. [f]

The Governor also met with the Communal Administrators (communes are sub-regions within a province) and informed them of the initiative to transport the textbooks. [g] In this regard, the Governor used his authority to draw actors to work together to ensure an effective supply chain for the delivery of textbooks. His actions opened the possibility for a more sustained and cost-effective multi-stakeholder process, and ensured political will for action.


Textbooks delivered to villages

The administrators agreed to mobilize volunteers at the commune level to deliver textbooks from the communes to the villages by motor vehicle, bicycle and other means. [h] This opened the possibility for a more sustained, community-based effort. The administrators met with directors of schools and village chiefs, who agreed to support the initiative and mobilized

volunteers in the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) to contribute to delivery. [i] The PTA decided to use the existing national community service program each Saturday morning in each community to deliver the books by foot, carrying the textbooks on their heads, in wheelbarrows or by basket on a bike. [j] The network of volunteers delivered 25,000 textbooks in the province within 60 days instead of the usual one-year timeframe. [k] The student-to-textbook ratio increased from 1:11 to 1:3 within 60 days; these textbooks had been awaiting delivery from the warehouse for 18 months.

In sum, this collaboration established a new type of supply chain to reach village schools. The province learned how to address a systemic constraint and develop their own system for distribution that would be a potentially long-term mechanism for ensuring timely delivery of textbooks.

Figure 4. Pilot II: Accelerating payment of teachers and reducing corruption, September 2007–March 2008



Pilot II: Accelerating the payment of teachers and reducing corruption (Figure 4)

Inefficiencies, long delays and corruption existed around paying newly recruited teachers, for example, bribes by new teachers to officials for information on the processing of files or to move forward any delays in communicating their files to the Ministry of Civil Service. Under the L4R, between September 2007 and March 2008, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Civil Service collaborated on a pilot initiative to address these constraints. The outcome chain from this initiative shows how reform was achieved and scaled-up.

Attention to problem

In September 2007, the Director General of the Civil Service decided to address severe delays in the payment of new teachers by holding bureaucrats accountable to new rules, to encourage transparency and expediency in processing files, such as streamlining the documents required. [l] Despite the difficulty of such a reform in the post-conflict context, the Director General accepted both personal and institutional responsibility for problem-solving around the change process. The Director General and her team launched a pilot initiative in six remote provinces to reduce the

time for payment. [m] Given that teachers constitute more than half of the employees within the civil service, the initiative had potential not only to advance universal primary education goals but also goals around improving the speed of payment to newly recruited civil servants (beyond teachers) more broadly.

By November 2007, the Director General realized progress was stunted. Poor communication between the Ministry of Civil Service and Ministry of Education had repeatedly hindered progress. She committed herself to resolving the obstacles. [n] The problem was symptomatic of much broader difficulties in collaboration and communication within the government—and had caused hindrances in many other processes. In February 2008, the Director General shared her experiences and obstacles, expressing the need for stronger collaboration with the Ministry of Education in a review meeting for the initiative that was attended by the second Vice President of Burundi. [o]

Collaborative problem-solving

To help address this, the second Vice President decided to bring together both ministers to discuss the resolution for these blocks, focusing on the problem of processing files for new teacher payment. [p] This outcome underscores the importance of high-

level oversight by authorities. In this instance, having high-level leaders involved in progress review of initiatives enabled the civil service to bring attention to issues that had become negative norms to discuss how to resolve them collaboratively. The challenge was a prolonged back and forth between the two ministries in processing files for new recruitments and payments, which it was possible to shorten. The meeting broke down the problem and identified potential solutions.

Efficient payment and reduced corruption


The Vice Minister of Education met with the Provincial Directors of Education in the provinces where the initiative was launched. (These Directors are responsible for the recruitment of new teachers and initiation of their files to recruit them.) They agreed on how the transmission of recruitment files for teachers could be expedited from the provinces to the central level. [q] That same month the Ministry of Education, Civil Service and the provinces began to follow the newly agreed upon expedited process. [r] All recognized the legitimacy of the new process because everyone decided on it, and the involvement of leaders at different levels provided the authority and ownership around the process for it to be enforced at all levels.

In March 2008, the director of the Civil Service and her team conducted a final review of the initiative and found they had been successful in reducing the time taken for newly recruited teachers in six provinces to receive their first paycheck from around one year to just three months. [s] Within three months, 717 new teachers received their paychecks without being subject to corrupt fees to release the payment. [t] The Civil Service and Ministry of Education agreed to institutionalize the improved information sharing between ministries. [u]

In sum, these outcomes influenced the motivation of newly recruited teachers and delivery of education services. Since they received payment faster, they no longer needed to follow-up on processing of their files (reducing absences from their schools). These outcomes also facilitated long-term improvements in collaboration across the ministries and provided an example of a governance reform to combat corruption.

Example of how the government cyclically scales-up the lessons learned from the pilots: In March 2008, the Civil Service and Ministry of Education scaled up

Figure 5. Pilot III: Improving connectivity to the electricity grid, June–September 2011



Institutional changes

— Leadership and participatory priority setting to strengthen public sector reforms

Learning/capacity changes

Other outcomes related to awareness, knowledge or skills, collaborative action, or the use of knowledge or innovative solutions.

beyond the initial six provinces and applied the lessons to the recruitment and payment of new teachers throughout the country. [9] The previous initiative provided the learning and authorizing environment and acted as a key lever for scale-up of closer collaboration among the Ministry of Civil Service, Ministry of Education and Provinces. In October 2008, the Ministry of Civil Service launched an initiative to reduce fictitious staff within the service, which resulted in the suspension of payment of 728 salaries to “ghost” individuals. Monthly savings are roughly equivalent to US \$530,759. On an annual basis, this was projected to total an amount of funds equivalent to the annual budget of the Ministry of Commerce—or half that of the Ministry of Civil Service. [10] In a country where government revenues are strained, making this significant amount of money available for other activities is valuable.

Pilot III: Improving connectivity to the electricity grid (Figure 5)

In Burundi there was a typical three-month wait time to connect new households and businesses to the national electricity grid. This was a key area to improve a Doing Business indicator for Burundi to increase access to electricity supply and was therefore a hindrance to the government's desire to improve its Doing Business rankings to attract increasing foreign investment. The outcome chain that improved efficiency in connecting new customers to the national grid exemplifies an agency-level change management process:

Attention to problem

Following the second government retreat in 2009, the managing director of the state electricity company in Burundi, REGIDESO (within the Ministry of Energy, Water and Mining) committed to raising the quality of life in urban areas by improving the supply of electricity and increasing its provision at a fair and affordable price, and mobilized teams within the ministry to address the goal. [v] The director and teams analyzed the constraints and identified key strategies to move forward to advance the goal. These included: increasing the production of electricity; increasing the number of clients; increasing the water supply rate; keeping client accounts up-to-date; reducing losses; and rehabilitating required equipment. [w]

Collaborative problem-solving

The managing director supported the teams to launch a series of targeted pilot initiatives between June and December 2009 to experiment with new processes by addressing particular constraints. For example, reducing the inspection period of client accounts from every three months to every two months: reducing the number of unpaid accounts that had not yet been disconnected and reducing delays in billing time of new customers from 6 months to 2 months. [x] It was important to improve services to build the image of REGIDESO in the eyes of their clients (it was very low).

Through these initiatives, REGIDESO introduced a new, potentially faster and simplified process to connect customers to the national electricity grid. This was a streamlined approach whereby clients make just one payment at the time of connection (rather than an application fee and later a connection fee), reducing administrative requirements and processing time. [y] Consequently, REGIDESO reduced the delay

in connection time to a more reasonable wait time of two months. [z] Before the initiative was launched, the number of new clients connected per month was 100; after completion of the initiative this number had risen to 150 new clients per month. The managing director of REGIDESO provided a supportive environment for experimenting with new procedures for streamlining, which had been an ongoing process since 2008.

Increased customer satisfaction and company income

Results also supported an IFC government program on economic governance whose first phase involved improving Burundi's ranking in Doing Business and resulted in Burundi appearing as one of the 10 most reformed African countries in the Doing Business Report of 2012 for improved business climate (elevating in ranking from 177 in 2011 to 169 in 2012).

In sum, REGIDESO learned how to address certain constraints and implemented a streamlined process to improve their efficiency in connecting new households and businesses to the national electricity grid.

Thus, as demonstrated through these three initiatives, ministries and agencies used the L4R program to build an authorizing environment (Outcome Area 1) to execute their ideas for change to further the country's development goals. Through rapid, results-focused initiatives and rapid cycle learning (Outcome Area 2), they engaged collaboratively with teams to experientially learn what solutions worked and did not work to address each constraint. They used the program to structure pilot solutions to improve the effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency of public services, reduce corruption and enhance government relationships centrally and sub-nationally. The successes offered learning to scale-up and build upon across government.

Contribution of WBI to Outcome Area 2: To support the implementation of these initiatives, WBI introduced rapid, results-focused initiatives with rapid cycle learning to Burundian officials for the L4R program to jumpstart and accelerate action for delivering results towards achieving national development agenda goals. WBI acted as initiators, conveners and as a resource for knowledge exchange to support the pilots in the health and education sectors. Training was provided on conducting initiatives to the ministries

SUBSTANTIATION OF OUTCOMES

To verify the accuracy of the outcomes mapped and enrich WBI's understanding of them, an external consultant selected four outcomes [1, 12, 14 and 20) and asked 10 people independent of WBI but knowledgeable about the change to review each and record whether they agree with the outcome as described. Four people responded to three outcomes [except 1]. Four of these substantiators fully agreed on the description of the outcomes and WBI's contribution to them and two provided additional information to clarify their significance. Excerpts of the substantiators' comments on the outcomes achieved:

"The approach is very good because after the training provided by the World Bank, it was time for the Government of Burundi to take ownership of this method to integrate it into the implementation of projects and programs. Otherwise, we would always be expecting World Bank experts to launch, on our behalf, projects to be executed in a short timeframe with tangible results. For the time being, most ministries have already integrated this method into the implementation of the action plans."

—Rosette Nizigiyimana, Vice-Minister of Civil Service

"The World Bank should consider giving further support to this program through a sustained program of ongoing evaluation. It should consider providing external coaches to help us better evaluate our performances in the rapid results, as often as necessary. It should extend the approach to other institutions, even private or parastatal ones."

—Odette Kayitesi, Minister of Agriculture

"Indeed, over the past few years, there has been an obvious change in the way projects in Burundi are managed and implemented using the system of results-oriented activity planning followed by the evaluation of results, using observable and verifiable indicators."

—Jérémy Ntiranyibagira, Director General of Human Resources to the General Staff of the Armed Forces

and agencies and their staff, and WBI financially supported and mentored the international coaches and national coaches who were fundamental instruments in the problem-solving process empowered through these initiatives.

WBI supported the government through providing technical assistance launching and conducting mid-point and final reviews of the initiatives. For example, in the case of the initiative on the payment of teachers by the civil service, the review helped to distill lessons learned from this pilot and the learning was then used to feed into the design of similar follow-up initiatives across the country and ministries to improve results in the civil service more broadly. On a broader scale, WBI provided ongoing support and guidance to the government and Steering Committee to implement initiatives cyclically over the multiple years of the program to build successively on the results and learning of pilots.

Outcome Area 3: Embedding results-oriented problem-solving in the public sector

Institutionalization of the results-oriented management tools of the L4R program has been a progressive

part of the change strategy within the design of this program.

In June 2007, the second Vice President, as head of the Steering Committee, had committed to build knowledge among public servants around the results-oriented management tools of the L4R program to tackle constraints across the public sector. As noted previously, he initiated a process to train coaches across the government. Since 2007, public servants with coaching capacities to use the results-oriented management tools have been embedded across all major ministries and agencies nationally. On a routine basis, the ministries started to engage teams to use rapid cycle learning to learn how to achieve priority results. [7]

Then, following the second government retreat in March 2009, the Vice Presidents of Burundi agreed to sign a public decree to mandate expansion of the program across government. [12] The decree, signed in July 2009, was instrumental to further institutionalize the results-oriented project management process of problem-solving by doing. Ministries launched initiatives using rapid cycle learning cycles iteratively, that

is, each trimester, to address constraints and record and exchange progress to document and learn from.

While more than 2,000 team members have been introduced to rapid, results-focused initiatives, a key challenge to further institutionalization has been extending the results-oriented project management capacities across government. Institutionalization requires sub-national government use of the tools as well as building them into national ministries and building capacity in the government to train coaches on their own. Until 2011, coaches were trained by WBI and WBI national coaches.

Since 2011, ENA began to train teams and launch initiatives to extend results-oriented project management skills to improve performance. [14] This helped to anchor the curriculum and knowledge and skills required for the L4R program into the key national organization responsible for training civil servants. In 2012, ENA developed sub-national training materials in the local language to support implementation of the program in decentralized contexts. [16] This further expanded the utility of the L4R program to reach areas where French was not widely used.

In 2012, ENA engaged stakeholders in consultations on options for institutionalizing the L4R program tools and practices within government ministries, as well as options for its financial sustainability within government. [17] This process provided key actors an opportunity to design a strategy to shape the integration and full ownership of the L4R program. ENA used the input to develop a strategic visioning paper incorporating the views of stakeholders. [18] The strategic visioning paper set a formal strategy for scale-up of the program, owned by all ministries and endorsed by donors.

In 2013, ENA began negotiations to secure government budget to strengthen the coordination of the L4R program. [19] This would be another step to continue the program within the government beyond WBI's support.

Overall, by 2013, ENA in partnership with WBI had intended to build a network of sub-national teams experienced in the use of rapid cycle learning to apply project management and results-oriented management skills and capacities. In addition, those trained previously by WBI are now internal coaches in teams within ministries at the national government level. [20] These individuals are sustaining and institutionalizing the culture of results progressively developed since 2006.

Contribution of WBI to Outcome Area 3: WBI contributed by providing results coaching, workshops and training to support the initial skills building in ministries. National results coaches were financed and guided who played a critical role in the process of preparation and signing of the decree through guidance to the Steering Committee.

WBI partnered with ENA to deliver coaching, workshops and training, including training coaches to be housed within ENA to guide future trainings. ENA was provided with training materials and expertise to integrate them into use by ENA trainers. WBI facilitated jointly with ENA the knowledge-sharing platform for decision-making on the strategy, and recruited a consultant to conduct interviews with donors and stakeholders who had been involved in the L4R program. The WBI-financed consultant helped to prepare the draft strategic visioning paper based on interviews and discussions during the workshop.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of several years, the L4R program developed a culture of results among leadership and teams in the civil service as well as the capacity to apply project- and results-oriented management tools. The civil service can use the tools to problem-solve and learn which practical solutions work in what context to advance institutional change. The program helped to develop leaders and teams, skills and new behaviors in the civil service to systematically find and adopt innovative solutions for identifying and overcoming institutional constraints.

The problem-solving process addressed constraints such as breakdown in communications, weak collaboration, corruption vulnerabilities, organizational dysfunctions and inefficiencies. It engaged, motivated and empowered leaders and teams to take new actions to change problems and broke down barriers from those that have a vested interest in keeping the current inefficient system.

The emphasis on team-building is key to the success of the program. Working as a team with a strong authorizing environment from leadership empowers a shared responsibility for results as well as personal and joint accountability. It enables the government to develop and use their collective capacity to advance reforms, rather than over burden individuals in already low capacity environments. It helps to overcome hierarchical inefficiencies within government that can impede change, since authorization for the reform sits

in another office. Teams are able to find innovative and effective solutions to problems in the country because of an enabling context for action that is overseen by the highest level of leadership in the presidency. Change is possible and solutions can be used to tailor lessons for scale-up within other parts of government or throughout the country.

The government retreat process helped align program outcomes from initiatives in ministries with development priorities for the country's growth, governance and social and economic transformation. Problems are systemically prioritized at the highest level with the Steering Committee, and then refined by senior leader champions in ministries and multi-actor teams. Through pilot initiatives, there is a gradual progress to unblock constraints and further advance development goals and priorities.

Ministries across the Burundian civil service continue to use L4R tools without WBI support. They continue without oversight from the Steering Committee and World Bank Country Office, and in some cases, without requests from ministers to use the tools to address a specific problem. WBI does not currently know how many initiatives are running in the government at any given time but has been informed by ministries of agriculture, health and defense, in particular, that the tools are continuing to be used.

Key outcomes supporting this institutionalization of results-oriented practices within the civil service include: the Presidential decree to strengthen country leadership, embedded coaches within national ministries and agencies and inclusion of results training within ENA's curriculum in the local language to build a larger cohort of coaches across the country, particularly in provinces. The outcomes relating to ENA demonstrate ongoing capacity development within the civil service such that the program can be scaled-up to reach civil servants at all levels across the country. The government has also undertaken research on ways to further sustain the program and begun negotiations on how to finance the program fully from the government budget.

NEXT STEPS

To continue to advance the program's objectives the training of additional civil servants in the tools of the L4R program must still be addressed. Some ministries are more immersed in applying the tools and are consequently operating at a faster pace and encounter challenges in implementation when they collaborate

with a ministry that is not as involved in applying the tools.

There is also an insufficient pool of high-quality results coaches. The existing pool is comprised of coaches who continue to support results-focused, rapid cycle learning teams in some ministries, and ENA coaches who do not have enough financial resources to expand the L4R program tools to the provinces. It is thus essential to continue to strengthen ENA's effectiveness and financial viability to provide regular training and re-training to coaches, as well as to anchor Burundian results coaches to the growing regional network of results coaches in Africa. Ongoing strengthening of coaches inside ministries should also be reinforced in a continuous way through implementing results and rapid cycle learning.

In addition, the government retreat process should continue and be used as an opportunity to recognize and reward results champions. This will create a healthy competition, maintain the authorizing environment and capitalize on and learn from effective practices.

Burundi is reviewing the Presidential decree for the L4R program that is still active despite government turnover since 2009, and considering how to strengthen the supervision and M&E of the government action planning under a structure chaired by the presidency.

Overall the L4R program is now owned and led by Burundi. Ongoing support from WBI is expected to include advisory support for the final stages of coach development by ENA, the continued institutionalization of the program's processes within the government and integration of Burundi coaches within the Africa regional results coach network to help continue to build their knowledge and expertise. ■

NOTES

¹ Mapping outcomes—and related outputs and milestones—can help us learn from change processes that occur during program delivery that often seem complex and opaque because they involve multiple actors and address large development problems. An outcome is what each social actor (or change agent) did, or is doing, that reflects a significant change in their behavior, relationships, activities, actions, policies or practice. The program may influence these changes, directly or indirectly, partially or wholly, intended or not. Outcomes are identified at two levels in relation to the goal: institutional changes relate to societal, policy and organizational changes; and learning/capacity changes relate to awareness, knowledge or skills, collaborative action, or the use of knowledge or innovative solutions. These levels are based on the Capacity

Development and Results Framework. The framework provides a systematic yet flexible approach to designing capacity development strategies and programs, monitoring and adaptively managing interventions, and evaluating and learning from their results.

² Outcome harvesting is a practical assessment tool from the outcome mapping community of practice. It can be used for real-time monitoring and evidence gathering from complex development processes that involve multiple stakeholders. It is based on a similar concept of locally driven change from the Capacity Development and Results Framework. The tool was customized to gather information on outcomes—and related outputs and milestones—to learn from what changed, for whom, when and where, the significance of the change and how the program contributed to each change.

³ The numbers in brackets correspond to the outcomes in Figures 2–5. The text that usually follows each outcome refers to its significance. The process of change the outcomes represent is seen in Figure 1.

⁴ Change agents are leaders, groups or organizations from government or non-state that drive change.

⁵ Change strategy refers to how change happened to advance progress toward the development objectives—the development problems addressed, types of outcomes achieved, WBI contributions, and partners involved. A change strategy may include different types of change processes or outcome areas depending on the complexity of the multi-actor institutional changes involved in a program.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

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WBI's Capacity Development and Results team led the outcome mapping; Jenny Gold coordinated the exercise with support from Ricardo Wilson-Grau. Sharon Fisher provided editorial and design services. Samuel Otoo provided overall guidance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Benjamina Randrianarivelo and Kay Winning, who led the mapping exercise.

Thanks to substantiators:

Odette Kayitesi, Minister of Agriculture

Andre Nduwimana, Director of ENA

Rosette Nizigiyimana, Vice-Minister of Civil Service

Jéremie Ntiranyibagira, Director General of Human

Resources to the General Staff of the Armed Forces