THE PEACE AND STABILITY INDEX:
A Mixed-Methods Evaluation Design for a Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Program in Somalia

INTRO

The Peace and Stability Index (PSI) was **designed to measure impact-level changes** in the stability of 6 districts in Somalia during the BORDERS II project. The tool was developed to **create a comprehensive picture of peace and stability** and capture the contextually relevant factors that influence peace and stability. The findings from the baseline PSI informed the programming for each BORDERS II target district.

THE PSI IS

- An **index with 6 domains comprised of 24 components.** The six key domains include:
  - *Impact* - Stability
  - *Outcomes* - Priority inter-communal conflicts managed; Responsiveness/involvement of local government in Peacebuilding; Capacity/Effectiveness of community peace organizations; Social Reconciliation initiatives; Joint socio-economic projects
- Scored by a panel of 5 expert scorers based on the qualitative data
- Adaptable and comprehensive to reflect **a holistic picture of peace and stability**
- **A tool for quantifying data** collected from focus groups and key informant interviews
- Assigns a score of 0-5 (0 = least favorable/5 = most favorable conditions) for each component
- Provides a composite Peace and Stability Index score for each district (max score is 120)

PEACE AND STABILITY INDEX TOOL

SCORE	0	1	2	3	4	5
SECURITY	Front line of military engagement between FGS and AS, or AS controlled	FGS/DG controls main town, but subject to frequent AS attacks and presence of several militia with shifting control in district	FGS/DG control of main town, and main routes across the district, with infrequent AS attacks	FGS/DG controls district but has limited control of militia /nascent police (and reported are not addressed)	FGS/DG controls the district and controls actions of armed militia /nascent police minimizing incidents of insecurity	A representative number of communities work with the military and police to consolidate security
RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE	High levels of abuse (including extra-judicial killing, torture, rape) with no means of redress	Customary and religious courts active on localized disputes (Councils of elders, religious leaders)	Customary and religious courts active on higher level disputes involving armed forces/groups	FGS/DG has an appointed magistrate engaged in specific cases, with customary and religious courts	Nascent judiciary works with the nascent police in handling accused persons well to access to justice	The DG has a nascent justice and police departments that are accessible to communities
LEGITIMACY OF DG	There is no recognizable DG / the authorities are viewed as an occupying force by communities	There is a recognizable DG but with no civil functions (only military security and intelligence)	The DG is managing basic security and district affairs but lacks clan balance and delegation of responsibilities	The DG has a sufficient clan balance and delegation of responsibilities	There is a constructive engagement between DG officials and with different communities	The DG has a recognized elected administration with a number of functioning staffed departments
OVERALL CAPACITY/ EFFECTIVENESS OF DG	The DG does not exist or does not have any capacity beyond military affairs	The DG is able to manage minimal functions but is highly centralized and focused only on security/ intelligence	The DG is engaged in minimal functions and engages with humanitarian / development plans	The DG is able, through a number of different staff, to engage in process and programmes to develop the DG	The DG works with others to advance policies and programs and regularly acts to advance implementation	The DG leads detailed planning processes and programmes and mobilizes the involvement of all available actors
COHERENT ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL, & NATIONAL GOVT.	The DG has relationships of open conflict with regional, & national govt.	The DG has tense relations and no effective cooperation with regional, & national govt.	The DG has communication with regional, & national government	The DG has a coherent policy of cooperation with regional, & national government, but limited direct interaction	The DG has coherent engagement with regional, & national govt, and regular interaction	The DG has strong engagement with regional, & national govt, and regular interaction

EXAMPLE DISTRICT LEVEL PROFILE: STABILITY

		B	E
	BASELINE/ENDLINE		
SECURITY	Very secure, with DG in control and minimizing incidents of insecurity. Organized security system (police and military), collaborate with Ethiopians, DPCs and elders on security, organized intelligence gathering, businesses open at all hours, freedom of movement. The administration rules with iron fist —if an AS cell is identified they are executed. Business booming, more flights coming in, etc.	4	5
RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE	In 2013, there were high levels of extra-judicial killings and no justice system for redress. In 2015, extra-judicial killings, etc, have reduced but are still occurring. Interrogate people and execute without trial. District courts are in place, but cases are mostly handled by the CoE. And disputes. If cases are too complex, district court takes over.	0	1
LEGITIMACY OF DG	The DG is highly centralized, and appointed by the Ethiopian government. Clan representative, but not seen as legitimate because Ethiopian army make appointments.	1	1
CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DG	Former DC is minister in the administration, so good relationship with that level. Nothing with national government. DG and Regional govt both appointed by Ethiopians.	1	1
COHERENT DG ENGAGEMENT WITH NEIGHBOURING DGS	Controlling relationship with neighbouring DGs. Ad hoc interaction with neighbours to work together. President of State visited many times.	1	3
COHERENT DG ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL & NATIONAL GOVERNMENT	One man show, focused control of security and district revenue. Focus is on security, do not offer social services. Officials do not have qualifications to lead on social issues.	0	2

Map: ETHIOPIA, KENYA, SOMALIA — Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Dadaab, Lamu, Gedo, M. Juba, L. Juba

RIVER JUBA
TARGETTED COMMUNITY RELATIONS (A-F)
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

BORDERS II:

The Broadening Options for Reconciliation, Development and Empowerment Among Somalis (BORDERS II) project ran for 36-months (December 2012-November 2015) in the Gedo and Jubba regions of South Central Somalia.

PSI SCORE BY DISTRICT

Bar chart — BASELINE / ENDLINE:
- LUUQ: 53 / 75
- DOLLO: 26 / 68
- BELETHAWA: 48 / 66
- ELWAK: 84 / 73
- AFMADOW: 45 / 76
- BADADE: 39 / 74

PRIMARY PSI DATA SOURCE

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS: religious leaders, district peace committees, district officials, council of elders, youth, women, and civil society groups

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS: district government officials, religious leaders, members of councils, district peace committees, livestock market committees

SAMPLE QUESTIONS

EXAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS OR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS:

(B) Community Engagement Networks and their engagement in governance
   B.1/Outcome: Effectiveness of local peace networks - CSO context

Please describe if and how different peace groups collaborate and network in your district?
   (a) Who is involved in regular coordination and how
   (b) What type of peace initiatives and processes are currently being implemented by CSO/CBO?

(C) Social Reconciliation
   C. 2/Output: Social reconciliation initiatives: Project planning
   (a) Please describe key social reconciliation initiatives (past or on-going)and their effectiveness/results
   (b) Please identify priority needs for social reconciliation and propose approaches

ACRONYMS

FGS: Federal Government of Somalia
DG: District Government
DC: District Commissioner
CSO: Civil Society Organization
CBO: Community Based Org
AS: Al-Shabbab

LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES

- Timing and context changes affect the data collected and PSI score
- Safety and security in communities during data collection
- Choose objective scorers to reduce scoring bias
- Conduct formative research prior to PSI
- Identify the most appropriate respondents for FDGs and key informant interviews
- Include general questions in PSI as well as project-specific questions
- Attribution to a specific project may be difficult

THE PSI WILL BE ADAPTED FOR PACT'S NEW SOMALI INTER- AND INTRA-COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS (SHIIR) PROJECT.

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