Predicament and Promise: The Internal Evaluator as Ethical Leader

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Abstract

Internal evaluators encounter risks but also significant opportunities to strengthen organizational and professional ethics. Potential contributions depend, in part, on the conjunction of ethics and evaluation in the role of the internal evaluator as the person specially commissioned to investigate value and render judgment based on evidence gathered. At the same time, risks increase when evaluation and ethics are brought together. In the words of one evaluator, “These are rather dangerous moments because a lot of energy is created when an evaluator expresses ethical values such as these. We have a great deal of power, whether we like to think so or not” (Jennifer Cartland, 2010). This article clarifies the risks in order to free up the potential.

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This is a preprint of an article accepted for publication in *New Directions for Evaluation* © 2011 Jossey-Bass: A Wiley ImprintI. Putting Ethics in Its Place

Ethics is often considered synonymous with morals or values, but distinguishing these concepts can shed light on the unique and powerful relationship between evaluation and ethics. Ethics is distinct from morals and values in much the same way that evaluation is distinct from value, results, and performance: both ethics and evaluation employ disciplined inquiry to reach reasoned judgment on complex operations under conditions of public scrutiny. For internal evaluators, this conjunction of ethics and evaluation brings risks but also significant opportunities to strengthen organizational and professional ethics. Potential contributions depend, in part, on the role of the internal evaluator as the person specially commissioned to investigate value and render judgment based on evidence gathered. Risks increase when evaluation and ethics are brought together. In the words of one evaluator, “These are rather dangerous moments because a lot of energy is created when an evaluator expresses ethical values such as these. We have a great deal of power, whether we like to think so or not” (Jennifer Cartland, 2010). This article attempts to clarify the particular risks faced by internal evaluators in order to free up their potential contributions to ethics in evaluation, within organizations, and in the external public arena.

Both ethics and morals function as important mechanisms of social regulation, along with markets, culture and tradition, and law. Each of these five mechanisms contributes to social order in its own way, as well as functioning interdependently with the others. Three of these mechanisms—morals, culture, and markets—appear in all known human societies and are rooted in our evolutionary heritage, so that each individual is born with the experience-expectant genetic equipment to encounter and employ these mechanisms in social life (de Waal, 1997; Iran-Nejad, 1993). Ethics and law become important as human societies build on this inherited order, continually converting interactions into patterns of behavior, patterns into expectations, expectations into norms, and norms into institutions (Wrong, 1994; Shapiro, 2011). A brief review of common perceptions of these five regulatory mechanisms can help distinguish the role each plays in building and maintaining social order.

*Morality* regulates individual and communal interactions through inherited and socialized predispositions but also through conscious individual judgments, that is, individual conscience (Durkheim, 1925/1973; de Waal, 1996; Hauser, 2006). Morality answers questions such as, Is this action right or wrong? Is this circumstance or result good or bad? Are you with us or against us?

*Markets* regulate the exchange of goods and services, from informal sharing and gifts to formal sales and purchases (Mauss, 1950/1990; Schieffelin, 1990; Schultz, 2001). Markets are governed under an expectation of reciprocity, often worked out in bargaining and negotiation and frequently finalized in a contract. Markets answer the questions, Is this exchange mutually advantageous? Is this product or service worth the price? Can you be trusted, or not?

*Culture and tradition*  accrue through time as the patterns and tools of behavior that are dependable, useful, comfortable, and meaningful: a shared knowledge often called “common sense” (Mead, 1930/1975; Lancaster, 1975; Whiting and Edwards, 1988). Culture and tradition answer questions such as, Is this food or activity safe? Is this pursuit worthwhile? How important is this relationship? Is this place or behavior sacred?

*Laws* formalize selected rules and commitments, as these are enacted by legitimate authority (Dworkin, 1986; Shapiro, 2011). According to Scott Shapiro’s “planning theory of law,” legal systems enable “communities to overcome the complexity, contentiousness, and arbitrariness of communal life by resolving those social problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, by nonlegal means alone” (2011, p. 171). Law answers such questions as, Are you empowered to decide this matter? How can this activity be coordinated? Is this behavior allowed or mandated?

*Ethics* in its broadest sense is rational reflection on disputes that arise in the preceding four mechanisms, in which competing claims are weighed and resolved under standards of public reason (Strauss, 1953; Frankena, 1963). Thus, ethics answers the questions, Is this duty or claim binding on all? Is this action or its result just?

Ethics is the regulatory mechanism that enables communities, organizations, associations, or jurisdictions to dispute about right and wrong or worth and value in accord with public reason. It is an exercise aimed at common understanding rather than a matter of personal moral conviction, leading to public recognition or agreement. Even though ethical disputes are not settled once and for all, the attempts nevertheless define a just social order as best it can be understood.

The interdependence of these five mechanisms, and in particular the role of ethics, can be illustrated in reference to markets. Markets generally work well to employ human talent efficiently and distribute goods equitably. In doing so, markets coordinate exchange using common sense of culture and tradition as well as morals such as honesty of information and concern for the common welfare (Schultz, 2001). Where necessary, societies enact laws to regulate these coordinations (Shapiro, 2011, p. 213), but conflicting moral claims require translating matters of morals into matters of ethics to determine what is just or unjust. As Ronald Dworkin observed, “Justice is a matter of the correct or best theory of moral and political rights [whereas law] is a matter of which supposed rights supply a justification for using or withholding the collective force of the state” (1986, p. 97). For example, the income tax is legal because it has been instituted as law by a body empowered to do so. I may believe the income tax is morally wrong and act on this conviction as a matter of personal moral integrity. To claim the income tax is unjust, however, requires that I state reasons under the standard of public reason and present these for public deliberation. A determination of justice is a matter of reasoned deliberation and judgment, rather than personal moral conviction, market reciprocity, tradition, or a fact of law. Full respect can be given to these other mechanisms, but attempts to obligate the public on the basis of cultural traditions or personal moral convictions are subject to ethical challenge. Ethics therefore functions as regulator of the other social regulatory mechanisms, analogous to the way that evaluation functions as the discipline upon which determinations of quality in other disciplines depends (Scriven, 2011). As John Rawls pointed out,

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust (1971, p. 3).

Ethics and justice are consequently always open to dispute. New claims of injustice can be brought before the public and old claims can be renewed; ethics and justice are by definition an incomplete enterprise.

II. The Predicament of the Internal Evaluator

The public’s trust in the professions—and its ethical claim on the professions—is based on each profession’s adherence to its standards and ideals of practice rather than merely on the satisfaction of particular clients. This ethical commitment was summarized by the sociologist Robert Bellah as the “tripartite structure of professional life” in the relationship between professionals, their clients, and professional standards:

Lawyers, for example, are certainly obligated to help their clients, but as officers of the court their higher obligation is to the law itself; put in the strongest terms, to justice though the heavens fall. When lawyers fail these higher standards in the unprincipled pursuit of their clients’ interests they violate the norms of their profession. Similarly doctors, even though their obligation is to care for their patients, have a higher obligation expressed traditionally in the Hippocratic oath. This higher obligation, though it is to serve the interest of the patient, does not entail necessarily following the patient’s wishes (1997, pp. 33-34).

Similarly, the ethical claim upon evaluation is that it be practiced with fidelity to its own standards of evidence, analysis, and judgment—in addition to and preeminent to serving clients’ interests. Nothing can replace this priority of ethical practice as the cornerstone of public trust.

The priority of ethics applies to the work of internal evaluators and externally contracted evaluation alike. As Sandra Mathison pointed out, “There seems to be no concrete evidence in the literature to support the contention that the nature of ethical dilemmas differs depending on whether one is an internal or external evaluator” (1999, p. 26). There is, however, an added complication for internal evaluators: dual loyalty. All evaluators owe loyalty to the public in their fidelity to evaluation standards, but internal evaluators also owe loyalty to their organization of hire where they serve as a member of the staff. Familiarity and fellowship as co-workers can also reduce the aura of external expertise (Mathison, 1999, p. 30), further heightening organizational loyalty.

The internal evaluator’s ethical challenges have deeper roots than personal sensitivities and loyalties, however, because co-workers in fact constitute a “normative reference group” that shapes moral perceptions and values in the workplace. As investigated by the anthropologist Raoul Naroll, the organizational workplace has taken the place of the traditional village or community as that face-to-face community in which moral norms are personalized and enforced:

Everyone knows everyone else, watches everyone else, gossips about everyone else. It is [where] the moral ideas of the tribe are transmitted, are transformed through gossip from theory to moral pressure. And it is primarily [where] individuals may gain or lose the esteem or respect of their fellow men and women (Naroll, 1983, p. 136).

Organizations become the normative reference group for the standards of mutual respect, productive participation on a team, living up to professional expectations, formation of personal identity, and self-esteem in a sense of increasing competence. Mutual protection is earned as members of a team defend one another’s reputation, fend off external demands, and guard their collective work. Each individual feels a moral obligation to contribute to the success of the team and organization, and each is held accountable to do so. For most workers, this on-going moral approval is the surest daily guide to how well one is doing one’s job. Conversely, moral disapproval in the workplace is a bitter experience; informal sanctions by co-workers can range from the social isolation of averted eyes and missed invitations to open shaming in front of co-workers or retaliatory reports to superiors.

The internal evaluator participates in this scene of moral interdependence—carefully balanced and navigated as it is—with a professional obligation to meet a standard beyond moral approval: a standard of public trust and accountability. In the same way that justice is not defined by personal moral convictions, the evaluator’s judgments of value cannot be determined by workplace approval. Of course, internal evaluators are as sensitive to the dynamics of moral approval and disapproval as any other workers, and their sense of self-worth and self-identity are tied up in organizational membership. Yet even though other workers can often depend upon moral approval or disapproval as their daily guide, the integrity of evaluation practice requires that evaluators step outside the world of moral approval in order to do their job.

The same ethical standard applies if managers interfere with the integrity of evaluation practice, for example, to change or suppress evaluation findings.

If their managers succumb to this temptation, evaluators must act. They may attempt to educate their managers, include a dissent in all reports released, refuse to sign the evaluation, refuse the assignment (raising the ethical issues in appealing any resulting disciplinary action), and/or look for new employment. Reference to a clearly stated and widely accepted code of ethics such as the AEA's Guiding Principles may be very helpful in taking any of these actions (Lovell, 1995, p. 62).

As can happen in any profession, evaluators may respond to these pressures by corrupting their practice. This corruption may be as simple as avoiding evaluation questions that might embarrass the organization or bring to light problems that would be costly to correct. It may require endorsing organizational communications or commitments without pointing out contradictions with the organization’s mission or code of ethics. Corruption can appear in evaluation reports that downplay findings that might jeopardize a renewal of funding or receipt of organizational awards. Corruption is sometimes inadvertently encouraged by the promise of incentives such as merit pay or the more subtle but powerful exchange of favors between internal evaluators and program managers, all the way up to the CEO. In all these cases, evaluators may believe they are acting selflessly for the benefit of the organization, without admitting that they may have aligned their own interests with those of their employer and thus sacrificed their profession’s integrity and the public’s trust.

Here, then, are the unique responsibilities and risks that constitute the internal evaluator’s predicament. In the course of performing their service, internal evaluators encounter ethical challenges typical of external evaluators and other professions but also incur ethical challenges unique to their role in regard to organizational loyalty and the risk of isolation or corruption.

III. The Promise of the Internal Evaluator: The View from Nowhere

Given the predicament of the internal evaluator, we can at the same time see the power in this role to strengthen the ethics of organizations and evaluation practice. Although the risks inherent in this role can be seen as putting the internal evaluator in a “weak position” to confront organizational injustices or ethical lapses (Mathison, 1999, p. 32), the risks also highlight evaluators’ authority to shape the moral order within their organizations. This authorizing power rests upon their professional and assigned responsibility to assess performance and results in light of objective, systematically gathered evidence and reasoned analysis.

The internal evaluator’s role is primarily regulative rather than productive (programming and results) or directive (as is management). However invested internal evaluators may be in the success or direction of the organization, they occupy a unique position within the organization as its view from the outside—viewing the organization’s work and results with the eye of Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator” (Smith, 1790/1984), reflecting back to their co-workers an objective view of their work. Herein lies the promise of the internal evaluator’s role: seeing the organization and its performance with the insider’s insight and at the same time taking a deliberate stand on objectivity: a “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986).

It is customary to think of evaluation as the systematic investigation of value, in terms of merit, worth, and significance (M. Scriven, personal communication, Mar. 9, 2005). Most obviously, the value in question is in the work of the evaluand, but matters of value pervade the practice of evaluation:

After all, evaluation is a politicized and judgmental practice, and both politics and judgments inherently involve values. In terms of politics, evaluation is often intended to inform policy, itself a values-laden enterprise. In terms of judgments values are integrally embedded in the selection of evaluation purpose, audience, and priority questions to answer, and especially in the criteria that are used to make judgments of program quality. The major task of evaluation is to render judgments of “goodness,” which are anchored in a selected set of criteria that privilege some values over others (Greene, 2010).

As the impartial spectator, evaluators must ground their judgment not merely in accord with the interests of the evaluand or their own personal moral or methodological preferences, but always with an eye to objective value, that is, value as weighed in the public view and presented and defended in terms of public reason: arguments that are valid and sound, employing objective evidence. This can mean questioning organizational values at every stage of the evaluation: purpose, audience, design, methodology, findings, reporting, and recommendations. It can also put the evaluator in the position of giving voice to the concerns of the larger public in regard to the impact of the work in question. This is not advocacy, but accuracy and objectivity—elucidating value in the enterprise in terms of objective benefit to those intended to be served and improved conditions in which they live.

The elucidation of value is sometimes a matter of making explicit what is subjectively valued by co-workers—an exercise similar to a typical values clarification exercise. This can present difficulties, however, if objectively gathered data do not conform to organizational values or assumptions. Evaluators can face the objection that they are merely imposing their own personal values over the personal values of others, asserting a privileged professional viewpoint that is merely posing as neutral. To meet this objection, evaluators stand on two social facts: *First*, objectivity is not another subjective view with merely relative significance: your view vs. mine. There are essential elements of objectivity to which evaluators hold their work accountable:

1. a public framework of thought, with judgments and conclusions based on reasons and evidence;
2. the use of norms of correct judgment, such as logical argument and rules of evidence;
3. an order of reasons based on principles and criteria;
4. a viewpoint distinguishable from a particular point of view;
5. an account of agreement upon methods of evidence and argument; and
6. the ability to explain disagreements (Rawls, 1996, pp. 110-112).

*Second*, evaluators hold strictly to neutrality of aim: not allowing their own comprehensive beliefs or personal point of view to corrupt their evaluation design, conduct, or reporting. Rather, evaluators commit themselves to the procedural values of impartiality, consistency, and equal opportunity, and it is these procedural values that give the evaluator’s work its objectivity, authority, and utility (Rawls, 1988, pp. 261-262).

Excellence in evaluation practice requires taking a professional stand apart from—although not necessarily against—self-interest and organizational loyalty. The evaluator identifies with the objective view of the work in question. In countless meetings and consultations within the organization, the evaluator has opportunities to share this impartial view-taking with co-workers: how to stand back from the fray of engagement, to examine accumulated evidence, to insist upon accuracy, to ground findings on evidence and judgments on analysis of the findings. This is the evaluative thinking that Michael Patton (2008) explicitly linked to evaluation capacity building:

Building the evaluation capacity of an organization to support staff in thinking evaluatively means integrating evaluation into the organization’s culture. This goes well beyond a focus on using the results of isolated studies. It takes us into the arena of organizational culture, looking at how decision makers and staff incorporate evaluative thinking into everything they do as part of ongoing attention to mission fulfillment and continuous improvement (p. 157).

Robert Stake (2004) described this as shifting from episodic thinking to criterial thinking, from the immediacy and personalization of experience to look at “attributes, properties, traits, characteristics, facets, and dimensions” (p. 15). Evaluative thinking can enter into the moral order of the organization and be extended in organizational culture. The potential impact can extend beyond concerns with program performance to objective view-taking in personnel performance, self-image, respect for diversity, and organizational impact on the public good.

In doing so, evaluation creates an ethical space—that is, a space defined by a temporary suspension of moral ethical assumptions. We will assume in this space a vacuum of intentions, a sense of anticipation, that its boundaries are given by abutting edges of varying expectations and perspectives. ..This is a space in which some people are invited to make novel judgements about the work of others, and in which the nature of those novel judgements can be regulated and scrutinized. It is in making relatively transparent the basis of judgement, that is, providing the data which people can interpret in different ways, that we add the ethical dimension. Ethical space invites regulation, the re-imposition of ethical order… (Kushner, 2000, p. 150).

The evaluator takes a leading role in building evaluation capacity, not only as one skilled in the methods of research but as one practiced in a way of thinking and acting. The evaluator exemplifies the building of evaluation capacity through fidelity in the practice of evaluation, in the long-standing tradition of ethical character formation through the practice of virtue (Aristotle, 1103-1104; Gadamer, 1976/1981; MacIntyre, 1984; Lickona, 1991).

IV. The Promise of the Internal Evaluator: Public Ethics and Public Deliberation

The focus up to this point has been the promise of the internal evaluator within the workings of the organization of hire. A second dimension of promise lies in the extension of organizational influence through the reporting and use of evaluation findings in the public arena. This external dimension of the internal evaluator’s promise appears in two ways: the faithful implementation of policies and programs (the extension of public authority into practice) and the use of evaluation findings to inform program design and policy formation (the extension of practice into programming and policy).

Faithful implementation cannot be blind obedience: compliance with program specifications and policy regulations requires interpretation at every turn, to see what the rule requires in this particular situation and how its meaning can be realized here and now. For every situation that is clear-cut and obvious, there are others in which extenuating circumstances or lack of information make the rule more difficult to apply or in which rules are in conflict with each other. Citing the example of mandated terms of study for a government program, Robert Lovell asked,

Suppose that the time limitation does not allow for study observations

over a sufficient time period, for example, to account for a likely seasonal

effect. Since the request is a matter of law, the evaluators' managers may be unable to obtain a time frame adjustment. Should the evaluators refuse the

assignment, possibly resulting in an even less-informed decision and creating

a possible disciplinary problem? Or should the evaluators complete the evaluation, clearly noting the limitations imposed, even though the product will

not meet the "highest appropriate technical standards" envisioned in section

IILA.l of the American Evaluation Association *Guiding Principles for Evaluators* (1995, p. 62)?

Compliance with laws and rules is first of all an act of understanding that must be repeated as practice and interpretation succeed each other, gradually revealing more meaning in the original intention of the rule. The evaluator plays a key role in this process, *first* by creating “a properly reflective distance” from the work at hand; *second* by enabling program and policy to “organize action, in the sense that they configure it, give it form and sense” (Ricoeur, 1986/1991, p. 195). This occurs early in the evaluation process through clarification of goals and rules and through identification of criteria and indicators; it continues through tracking evidence of implementation and results. The evaluator thus assures that resources will be used in accord with the purposes intended, thus upholding the integrity of policy and planning.

The converse of faithful implementation is the translation of learning from practice into program improvements and policy, as the findings and recommendations of evaluators guide future action. This guidance can appear as lessons learned or—more ambitiously—as best practices, benchmarks, revised standards, or performance mandates. It must be noted that powerful self-interests can skew evaluation findings and recommendations to influence policies, resource allocations, regulations, or product approvals, e.g., in pharmaceutical trials (House, 2006). Here the ethical practice of evaluation must stand as the public’s guardian of the credibility of evidence-based planning and policy; on this the credibility and authority of evaluation itself depends.

Internal evaluators can also play an important role in assessing and expressing their organization’s interactions, achievements, and impact in the public arena. The satisfaction of legal or grantor requirements alone does not always ensure that justice has been served. It lies within the internal evaluator’s purview to ask if programs are carried out in a manner that affirms human dignity, human community, and fair terms of cooperation. Similarly, evaluators can examine results achieved for evidence of social benefit and just allocation of goods and services.

Conclusion: New Directions in Public Ethics

The promise and power of the internal evaluator can be summarized in three constructions of justice. These bring into focus, as well, the role of evaluation in addressing a crucial gap that has emerged in public ethics in recent decades.

*First*, justice is constructed in each person as citizen, each of whom is considered capable of acting in accord with the General Will as well as in his or her own self-interest (Rousseau, 1762/1967). Internal evaluators support this work of justice by building evaluation capacity and nurturing evaluative thinking within their organizations: taking the view from nowhere, to act in accord with the public good. This capacity is strengthened through staff training or workshops, but even more importantly in the process of evaluation itself. Each internal evaluator is a coach in evaluative thinking, helping each member of the staff think as a citizen: objectively, systematically, and fairly in terms of the merit, worth, and significance of implementation and results.

*Second*, justice is constructed as “the good of another” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1130a). It is not enough to see the internal evaluator as the quality assurance officer to help the organization maximize its own efficiency and service delivery. To fully embody the determination of value in the organization’s work, the evaluator’s perspective cannot stop at the boundaries of the organization but must look to external effects and credibility as well. *Value* cannot be defined solely as value to the organization. When fellow staff members might feel threatened in taking responsibility for the impact of their work and rather take shelter behind a supervisor, internal evaluators can provide crucial support by asking the tough questions:

What is your own responsibility for the actions you take when you are carrying out instructions? To what extent should you take the initiative to raise issues with or make recommendations to your superiors? Do you tell political and administrative superiors what they want to hear or provide honest and complete analysis (Svara, 2007, p. 41)?

*Third*, justice is constructed in the arrangement of basic institutions such as organs of government, human rights, and the fair terms of cooperation in markets and politics (Rawls, 1971). Without the regulation that justice provides, these institutions would be shaped entirely in accord with inherited traditions or the preferences of those with the power to impose their own interests. Because justice is determined through public deliberation under the standards of public reason, the objective evidence provided through evaluation is crucial. To give one of many possible examples, schools may or may not be serving their educative purpose; this determination depends, in part, on evaluation of the quality of their performance. The predominant mood among legislators favors a results-oriented regime of standardized testing to measure quality of instruction, even though evaluators are aware that confounding influences can weaken this causal link:

Test scores are an inadequate proxy for quality because too many factors outside of the teachers’ control can influence student performance from year to year—or even from classroom to classroom during the same year. Often, more than half of those teachers identified as the poorest performers one year will be judged average or above average the next, and the results are almost as bad for teachers with multiple classes during the same year (Bausell, 2011, p. 12 WK).

 Bausell proposed adding a process measure with high correlation to instructional value-added: “measuring the amount of time a teacher spends delivering relevant instruction,” (p. 12 WK). This is a good example of the kind of contribution internal evaluators can make in the formulation of governmental or organizational policy and thus in the establishment of justice in the public arena.

Just as ethics is the discipline that enables citizens to consider the public good apart from their own partial benefits, evaluation is the discipline that provides credible evidence and judgments of value to inform them in doing so. This is the fundamental role of evaluation as a social institution, without which it would cease to function as a profession performing a public office and instead become merely a tool for public relations or an expertise for hire.

Recent decades have seen a shift in public culture that highlights evaluation’s crucial role in justice, marked in some ways by widespread endorsement of the New Public Management model proposed in *Reinventing Government* (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In this model, administrators are expected to take a business approach to government, providing services to citizen-customers in the public marketplace. Administrators are no longer seen as mere implementers, but rather as entrepreneurs and inventors in service delivery; the legislature determines which results are expected and leaves administrators to figure out how to achieve these results. Legislators see their ethical obligations embodied in the outcomes expected rather than in the means employed; administrators, leaving matters of justice to the legislature, can pursue the ends expected in whatever way works best, assuming “the end justifies the means” (and basic rights are respected). Both legislators and administrators entrust ethical accountability more to the working of the marketplace than to regulation: the most efficient and effective means are assumed to guide service delivery to maximum social benefit by the “invisible hand” of market pressures.

This displacement of ethical responsibility from administrators upon legislators and both upon the marketplace does not honor the social facts. As John Rawls remarked long ago, “the market fails altogether in the case of public goods” (1971, p. 272).

For administrators and legislators to take responsibility for justice in public policy formation and implementation requires that they take the objective view embodied in evaluation, holding their implementation and results publicly accountable to evidence of performance and impact on the human condition. In support of this commitment to justice, internal evaluators can provide the crucial support of evaluative thinking—the view from nowhere. This includes, as an ordinary interest of evaluation, the assessment of the ethical implications of programs that are being evaluated, informing not only internal government operations but public deliberations as well. Internal evaluators can support public deliberation on matters of justice by setting forth the objective basis for claims. What, in fact, are the responsibilities and commitments of office? What are the conditions and requirements of public participation, and how well do these satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness and human dignity? How are goods and services being allocated, and can this distribution be justified in reasonable terms of merit or need? These questions can be investigated, and where their agencies are involved, it lies within the duties of internal evaluators to investigate them.

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